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IS A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST A
"SECURITY"?: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL DEFINITIONS ADD A
LEGAL DIMENSION TO ECONOMIC
SPECULATION
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, limited partnerships have not been widely
used investment vehicles. Among investments which limit the
investor's liability, corporate securities are generally more
available and provide for greater ease of transfer. During the
past decade, however, tax shelter programs, and particularly
limited partnerships, have become increasingly popular.' In
California they have been employed for a wide range of invest-
ments, from real estate syndications' to the financing of vine-
yards and cattle feed lots.' The advantage of the limited part-
nership form is that it allows the start-up costs, depreciation
deductions and other business losses to flow directly through
to the limited partners,' who are thereby provided with some
form of investment loss to offset income earned from other
sources. In addition to saving tax dollars, an investor in a lim-
ited partnership may also benefit from any profits earned by
1. See Van Camp, Living With Tax Shelters in California: A Discussion of the
New California Real Estate Syndication Rules, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 403 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Van Camp].
Legislation has been proposed which could significantly reduce the tax shelter
advantages of limited partnerships. H.R. 10261, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The
passage of such legislation will undoubtedly have an effect on the future use of limited
partnerships as tax shelters, and it may cause some investors who have entered limited
partnerships as tax shelters to seek a way out of an unwanted profit-making invest-
ment. Under such circumstances, the issue of whether or not the particular limited
partnership interests are securities may be an important point of contention. Where
the partnership interests have not been registered or qualified under the federal or state
securities laws, a limited partner may attempt to prove that the interests in the
partnership are securities and were therefore sold illegally. Under the federal and state
securities laws an investor may recover his investment under such circumstances. 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1970); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25503 (West Supp. 1975).
2. Generally, " real estate syndicate" refers to any group of investors formed for
an investment in real estate. Such investments may vary widely as to the type of real
estate investments made. See generally Augustine & Hrusoff, Special Problems of
Public Limited Partnerships: Investment Fees and Transferability of Interest, 7 CALIF.
WEST. L. REV. 58-59 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Augustine & Hrusoff]; Comment,
SEC Regulation of California Real Estate Syndicates, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 206 (1973).
3. See Van Camp, From Garden Apartments to Cattle to Pistachio Groves:
Regulating Tax Shelters in California, 4 PAc. L.J. 703 (1973).
4. Profits and losses incurred by a limited partnership are taxed directly to the
limited partners. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 702.
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the partnership enterprise.
With the expanded marketing of this type of investment,
the need for regulation to protect investors is clear.' Regulation
is provided in California by the California Corporate Securities
Law of 19686 and the California Real Estate Syndicate Act.7
The Securities Act of 19338 also governs the issuance of securi-
ties within California which come under its broad jurisdiction.'
Generally, these statutes require that a proposed offering be
either "qualified" or specifically exempted from qualification
before it can be marketed.' ° Qualification insures that invest-
ment devices of a type which pose a potential risk to the public
will meet certain standards of disclosure set by the regulatory
agencies." Specific legal remedies are available in the event of
a failure to comply with the qualification requirements."2 In
addition, the California laws and the Securities Act of 1933
have express anti-fraud provisions.'"
In order to come within the ambit of these regulations the
investment device must be a "security."'" If the contemplated
5. Before the boom in tax shelter programs, limited partnership interests were
typically confined to high-income investors who had the benefit of professional advice.
As limited partnerships and other tax shelter programs proliferated, they were offered
and sold to a broader range of investors who were generally less sophisticated and not
as well advised as their earlier counterparts. Van Camp, supra note 1, at 403.
6. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25000 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
7. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10250 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
9. The use of interstate commerce or the mails to offer, sell, or deliver a security
triggers jurisdiction under the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
10. 15 U.S.C. §8 77e-f (1970); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10270 (West Supp.
1975); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (West Supp. 1975).
11. "Qualification" is the term used in the California Code, and will be used in
this comment to include "registration," which is the analogous term used in the federal
securities laws.
The qualification statement is basically an information document. The actualprocess of qualification varies between the SEC, the California Department of Real Es-
tate, and the California Department of Corporations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-g (1970); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10271 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25111-13 (West
Supp. 1975).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, q (1970); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10288 (West Supp.
1975); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25400-01 (West Supp. 1975).
In addition to disclosure requirements and anti-fraud regulation, the California
Corporate Securities Law and the Real Estate Syndicate Act give the commissioners
of their respective departments discretion to withhold or revoke qualification permits
if it is determined that the transaction or offering is not "fair, just, or equitable." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10280-81 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West
Supp. 1975).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10238.6-.7 (West Supp.
1975); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25503, 25540 (West Supp. 1975).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10270 (West Supp. 1975);
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investment is not a "security" the regulations do not apply and
no qualification is required. Consequently, the threshold legal
question for a party marketing an investment vehicle must
always be: is it a security? For many investments, such as
corporate stocks, the answer is obvious. On the other hand, less
common types of investment interests may require careful
analysis. Interests in limited partnerships 15 fall into this latter
category.
Some of the authorities on the subject have asserted that
all limited partnership interests are securities",I although the
reasons offered to support this view are vague and not based
on current interpretation of the securities laws." Other com-
mentators have indicated that limited partnership interests
may or may not be securities, I" or that no bona fide limited
partnership interest is a security. 9 Three California appellate
court decisions have adopted the third position.2" Thus, the
status of limited partnership interests under the securities laws
is far from settled. Clarifying it, so that a syndicator2' can know
with reasonable certainty that a limited partnership offering is
or is not a security, will require an examination into the statu-
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (West Supp. 1975).
15. A "limited partnership interest" refers to a right of participation as a limited
partner and includes the right to have the advantages accruing from the limited part-
nership. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (4th rev. ed. 1951).
16. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 309 (3d ed. 1972); H. MARSH
& R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968, at 161
(1969).
17. Both of the commentators cited in note 16, supra, maintain that limited
partnership interests are securities because the limited partners may not, by defini-
tion, take part in the control of the partnership business. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 309 (3d ed. 1972); H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968, at 161 (1969). While it is true that the
applicable partnership law does not allow limited partners to participate in the control
of the partnership enterprise, CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (West Supp. 1975), investor
passivity, taken alone, has never been the test for finding a security under the state or
federal definitions. See text accompanying notes 69-77, 98-103 infra.
18. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 503-05 (2d ed. 1961).
19. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate
Securities Act, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 361-63 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Dahlquist].
20. Solomont v. Polk Dev. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966);
Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961); Farnsworth v. Nevada-
Cal Management, Ltd., 188 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1961).
21. For the purposes of this comment, "syndicator" shall mean the person,
group, or corporation which initiates and forms the limited partnership, to include the
offer and sale of the partnership interests. This consolidation of roles is done to avoid
confusion, and in reality the parties who initiate, form and market partnership inter-
ests may not be the same.
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tory definitions of "security" and the cases which interpret
them.
It will be the purpose of this comment to provide such an
examination, and a critical evaluation of the current state and
federal definitions of "security" as they relate to limited part-
nership interests. The first section analyzes and argues against
the proposition that limited partnership interests must be se-
curities merely because some types of limited partnership in-
terests fall within the exemption provisions of the securities
laws. The second section sets out California's statutory defini-
tions of securities and evaluates two judicial tests promulgated
to interpret the meaning of "security" under the California
Corporate Securities Law. Next, the judicial definition of "se-
curity" under the Securities Act of 1933 is described and its
application to limited partnership interests analyzed. This pro-
cess leads to the conclusion that in many cases it is impossible
to determine, by applying current state and federal standards,
whether or not particular limited partnership interests are se-
curities, and consequently that the standards need to be more
precisely defined. The final section presents a test employed by
the Hawaii Supreme Court, which provides an example of how
the California and federal definitions might satisfactorily be
clarified.
A DEFINITION BASED ON THE EXEMPTION PROVISIONS
Certain types of securities do not require qualification be-
cause of specific exemption provisions in the state2 and federal
laws.2" In the case of limited partnerships, the "private offer-
ing" exemption, which exempts interests not offered and sold
to the public at large,"4 is the most commonly used. One argu-
ment for the proposition that limited partnership interests are
securities is that if they were not, there would be no need spe-
cifically to exempt private limited partnership offerings from
the securities laws." Carried to its logical extreme, this
argument would hold that each and every interest or transac-
22. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10260-62 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. CORP. CODE
99 25100-06 (West Supp. 1975).
23. 15 U.S.C. 99 77c-d (1970).
24. Id. § 77d(2); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10261 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25102(f) (West Supp. 1975).
25. This argument has been made by one of the leading commentators on Cali-
fornia limited partnerships. See Freshmen, Partnership and the Corporate Securities
Law of 1968, 44 L.A. BAR BULL. 520 (1969).
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tion which is exempted is necessarily a security.
While the presence or absence of an exemption may be
some indication of the relative need for regulation, it is not
determinative of the "security" question. It is doubtful that the
drafters of the securities laws intended the exemptions from
qualification to define what is and what is not a "security,"
especially in light of the fact that specific definitional sections
were drafted for that purpose.2" The threshold determination of
whether or not a limited partnership interest is a security must
be made independently of the qualification exemptions, and
ultimately, with reference to the statutes which define "secu-
rity."
THE CALIFORNIA DEFINITIONS
A California limited partnership interest may come under
the jurisdiction of either the Department of Real Estate or the
Department of Corporations. The Real Estate Syndicate Act
applies only to real estate transactions,27 while the Corporate
Securities Law is not limited in scope as to the type of business
transactions covered. As a general rule, limited partnerships
with fewer than 100 partners formed solely for an investment
in real property come within the jurisdiction of the Department
of Real Estate." All other limited partnership interests, includ-
ing real estate limited partnership interests not covered by the
Real Estate Syndicate Act, are governed by the Corporate Se-
curities Law. This distinction is important because the statu-
tory definitions of "security" are different under the two laws.
Statutory Definitions
The Real Estate Syndicate Act provides a broad, simple
definition of "real estate syndicate security" which expressly
includes limited partnership interests. A "real estate syndicate
security" is "any interest in a real estate syndicate,"29 and a
real estate syndicate is
any general or limited partnership . . . owned beneficially
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1975).
27. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10251 (West Supp. 1975).
28. Id. The California Department of Corporations has issued guidelines which
specifically delineate jurisdiction between the Department of Real Estate and the
Department of Corporations. See Cal. Dep't of Corp., Jurisdiction of Real Estate
Syndicate Qualification Release No. 32-c (June 27, 1973).
29. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10251(c) (West Supp. 1975).
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by no more than 100 persons and formed for the sole pur-
pose of and engaged solely in investment in or gain from
an interest in real property, including, but not limited to,
a sale, exchange, trade, or development. 0
Thus, the sale of any limited partnership interest that con-
forms to this definition will be considered the sale of a "real
estate syndicate security" and will be subject to the regulatory
provisions of the act, including the qualification requirement.
The characterization of limited partnership interests
under the Corporate Securities Law presents a more difficult
question of interpretation. While section 25019 of the Corpora-
tions Code defines "security" broadly, it does not specifically
include interests in a limited partnership." Of the securities
expressly enumerated in that section, a limited partnership
interest could be described as either a "profit-sharing agree-
ment" or an "investment contract"; but such characterizations
are not determinative of the question. "Investment contract"
and "profit-sharing agreement" are only a little less broad than
"security," and themselves require definition. Rather than de-
fining each of the statutory categories separately, it has been
the practice of the California courts to focus on the underlying
nature of the interests or transactions involved.32 It has consis-
tently been held that form must yield to substance,33 and the
crucial question is whether the interest or transaction comes
within the regulatory purpose of the Corporate Securities
30. Id. (a).
31. Section 25019 defines "security" as
any note; ... certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement; . . . investment contract; . . . certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in an oil, gas or mining title or lease or in payments out of
production under such a title or lease; ... or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guar-
antee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1975).
32. Typically, a court will use one of the terms enumerated in section 25019 of
the California Corporate Securities Law to describe the interest or transaction at issue,
but the decisions focus on the meaning of "security" rather than particular statutory
terms. See, e.g., Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112
Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974); People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284(1972). In the landmark case, Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811,
361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), the court did not identify the interest with one
of those listed in the statutory definition.
33. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906,
907, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 187 (1961).
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Law. 4 Such determination necessarily involves a case-by-case
approach."
The Mutual Selection Test
A close examination of the case law reveals that California
courts have used a number of standards to determine whether
a particular investment vehicle is a security. The one which is
most commonly associated with limited partnership interests
has its roots in an article written by T. W. Dahlquist in 1945
defining the scope of the California securities laws.3" Dahlquist
cites four general attributes of securities:
an attempt by an issuer to raise funds for a business ven-
ture or enterprise; an indiscriminate offering to the public
at large where the persons solicited are selected at random;
a passive position on the part of the investor; and the
conduct of the enterprise by the issuer with other people's
money. 7
In his discussion of partnership interests Dahlquist focuses on
the second attribute. He maintains that in a "bona fide" lim-
ited partnership, the memberships are never indiscriminately
offered to the public. 8 A true limited partnership always in-
volves a right of delectus personarum, a right to determine
membership:39 each partner must approve the admission of a
new partner or the transfer of a partnership interest." Where
such a right of mutual selection exists, Dahlquist would hold
that the partnership is a "bona fide" partnership and the sale
of an interest therein does not constitute the sale of a security.4
Three California appellate court decisions dealing with
limited partnership interests have focused on the mutual selec-
tion test without specifically adopting the other Dahlquist cri-
teria." In Farnsworth v. Nevada-Cal Management, Ltd., 3 the
34. Id. Generally, the securities laws are remedial in nature, and their purpose
is to protect the public from unsubstantial or fraudulent investment schemes and the
securities based upon them. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917); People
v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951).
35. People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 602-03 (1951).
36. Dahlquist, supra note 19.
37. Id. at 360.
38. Id. at 363.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. One recent federal district court decision has also employed the mutual
selection test in a case involving both general and limited partnership interests.
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limited partners were co-owners of real property in Nevada and
California. Each contributed his share of the property in return
for an interest in the limited partnership, and no interests were
offered or sold to parties outside the group.44 The court held
that the limited partnership interests were exempted from
qualification With the Department of Corporations because
they were "not offered to the public."45 However, as an inde-
pendent grounds for affirmance, the court applied the mutual
selection test. Noting that the partnership was plainly a
"closed venture"" in which the partners were previously asso-
ciated, the court concluded that the undertaking was a bona
fide limited partnership and the interests sold did not consti-
tute securities within the meaning of the statute. 7
In another 1961 case, Rivlin v. Levine,4" the court used the
mutual selection test to find that limited partnership interests
were securities. In Rivtin, the defendant had solicited various
friends and acquaintances to invest as limited partners in a real
estate venture; but, unlike the Farnsworth situation, there was
no prior association among the limited partners and they never
met as a group." On this basis the court found that the element
of mutual selection was missing and therefore no bona fide
limited partnership was formed. 0 A third case, Solomont v.
Polk Development Co. ,"' involved essentially the same fact
situation. The partnership interests had been offered to various
individuals without an opportunity for a mutual meeting or a
unanimous selection of the partners.2 The trial court found the
interests to be securities and the appellate court affirmed, cit-
ing the Rivlin rule. 3
The Dahlquist article and the cases, taken together, create
some confusion as to whether the element of mutual selection
must be present at the inception of the limited partnership, or
Curiously, the court applied the test only to the general partnership interests. Hirsch
v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1226-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
43. 188 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1961).
44. Id. at 388-89, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35.
45. Id. at 386, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
46. Id. at 389, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
47. Id. at 390, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
48. 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961).
49. Id. at 23, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
50. Id.
51. 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966).
52. Id. at 497, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
53. Id.
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whether it is akin to a restriction on transfer which pertains
only to the addition or substitution of partners. Dahlquist did
not confront this issue directly, but as authority for his asser-
tion that mutual selection is necessary in bona fide limited
partnerships, he refered to the 1945 Civil Code sections54 which
required the signature of all the partners for the admission of
additional or substituted limited partners. This supports the
conclusion that Dahlquist intended the mutual selection test
to be based on the statutory partnership law, and to be applica-
ble only to the sale of interests after formation of the partner-
ship.
The cases, however, indicate an opposite conclusion, and
they are the only authority available for a correct application
of the mutual selection test. While none of the cases employing
the test specifically states that there must be a mutual selec-
tion of partners at formation, each of the three appellate court
cases clearly bases its holding on factors relating to the incep-
tion of the partnership.5" Thus, it can be implied from the
consistent application of the principle that the mutual selec-
tion requirement is to be applied to the circumstances sur-
rounding the formation of a limited partnership: where there
is, at the inception of the venture, an exercise of the right of
mutual selection by prospective partners, California courts
applying the mutual selection test will find that the limited
partnership interests offered are not securities and thus not
subject to the provisions of the Corporate Securities Law.
The mutual selection test is intended to be applied only
to partnership interests.5" Essentially, it is a negative criterion.
If the element of mutual selection is present, the partnership
interest will not be considered a security. On the other hand,
the mere fact that mutual selection is absent should not neces-
sitate a finding that a partnership interest is a security. Cer-
tainly a court will require that other, positive characteristics of
a security be present before it will declare the interest subject
to the securities laws. The three cases employing the mutual
selection test do not indicate precisely what elements make up
any additional criteria for determining security status. Pre-
54. Dahlquist, supra note 19, at 363.
55. See Solomont v. Polk Dev. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966);
Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961); Farnsworth v. Nevada-
Cal Management, Ltd., 188 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1961).
56. See Dahlquist, supra note 19, at 361-65.
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sumably a court would apply either Dahlquist's four-part de-
scription of securities57 or the various criteria which are an-
nounced in other California securities cases not employing the
mutual selection test.5" Although the mutual selection test was
originally formulated by Dahlquist, it has been applied inde-
pendently of his general description of securities, and it is more
realistic to view it as a primary test to be used in conjunction
with other criteria only when limited partnership interests are
in question.
The use of the mutual selection test will generally compel
a result related to the number of limited partners in a particu-
lar partnership. As a practical matter, most larger limited part-
nerships are offered to the public, and in most instances a valid
mutual selection would be highly improbable by virtue of the
number and dispersion of the limited partners. Under the mu-
tual selection test, the lack of a delectus personarum would
militate towards a finding that the interests in such
partnerships are securities. On the other hand, a smaller lim-
ited partnership, where mutual selection of members takes
place, would not be subject to the securities laws in spite of the
fact that an interest in the partnership may resemble a security
in all other respects.
The Risk Capital Test
The major test used by California courts to define "secu-
rity" is commonly referred to as the "risk capital" test. Under
this test an interest will be deemed to be a security whenever
the investor is required to provide the capital which will be
risked in the promoter's enterprise. The test was originally ap-
plied by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski,59 which involved the sale of memberships in
a developing Marin County country club. Memberships were
offered to the public and the proceeds were used to provide
capital for purchase of the club's property.'" The court quoted
Dahlquist's four general attributes of a security,6 but then fo-
cused on an element the Dahlquist definition did not include:
risk to the purchaser's capital.
57. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 69-73 infra.
59. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
60. Id. at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
61. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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We have nothing here like the ordinary sale of a right
to use existing facilities. Petitioners are soliciting the risk
capital with which to develop a business for profit ....
Only because he risks his capital along with other purchas-
ers can there be any chance that the benefits of club mem-
bership will materialize.2
The court stated that the solicitation of risk capital constitutes
the sale of a security whether or not there is an expectation of
profit by those who supply the capital. 3
Since Silver Hills, the California courts have applied the
risk capital test to categorize a broad spectrum of interests. 4
In each of the cases where the interest at issue has been found
to be a security, the pivotal element has been the fact that the
investor furnished the capital risked in the enterprise. 5 Where
the investor's money was not at risk, courts have declined to
characterize the interest as a security. In Hamilton Jewelers v.
Department of Corporations,6 for example, the court of ap-
peals found that the sale of diamonds coupled with a buy-back
guarantee did not involve risk to the purchaser, who was free
to dispose of the gems or sell them back to the jewelry store
with interest, and consequently held that the contract was not
a security.
Risk to invested capital is clearly an essential characteris-
tic of a security, 6 but if risk is the only criterion for finding a
security, the test is too broad to be useful. Undoubtedly, the
California courts that have used the risk capital test have also
looked for other key elements; in stressing the risk feature,
however, they have failed to expressly set out those other ele-
ments.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
64. E.g., Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112
Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974) (sale of diamonds coupled with a buy-back guarantee); People
v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972) (cattle care contracts);
Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App. 3d 224, 84 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970) (undescribed interests
in ranch property); People v. Walberg, 263 Cal. App. 2d 289, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968)
(unsecured promisory notes issued by a nonprofit corporation).
65. See, e.g., People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284
(1972); Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App. 3d 224, 84 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); People v.
Walberg, 263 Cal. App. 2d 286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
66. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974).
67. Id. at 335-36, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
68. The importance of the element of risk is given extensive treatment in Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18
CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey].
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One of the more obvious elements, an investment in a
common enterprise, can be implied from its presence in
virtually all the cases following Silver Hills."5 Another factor
which can be found in a number of the California cases defining
''security" is a requirement that investors take a passive role
in the conduct of the enterprise. 0 In People v. Syde,7" a Califor-
nia Supreme Court case preceding Silver Hills, the court
stressed the distinction between active and passive participa-
tion by investors,7" holding that the Corporate Securities Law
is not applicable where investors are active participants in the
enterprise. Unfortunately, Syde and the cases which follow it
do not delineate the amount or type of investor participation
which will be allowed before investment interests are deter-
mined to be securities. It is not clear whether the investor must
be entirely passive, or whether some limited participation in
the conduct of the venture is permissible; nor is it certain
whether the prohibition applies to all areas of possible partici-
pation, or only to managerial control.
It is also possible that the Silver Hills court intended to
incorporate as criteria Dahlquist's four-part description of se-
curities.74 It is quoted in the Silver Hills decision" and again
in a 1970 appellate court decision defining "security,"7 but it
is not clear whether it is intended actually to provide specific
standards for the classification of an interest, or is included
only as a general description of securities. Thus, the risk capital
test, as it has developed in California, provides somewhat un-
certain guidance for the identification of a "security."
69. See cases cited note 64 supra.
70. See, e.g., People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284
(1972); Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1964).
71. 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951).
72. In Syde the California Supreme Court stated:
It is settled that the Corporate Securities Law was not intended to
afford supervision and regulation of instruments which constitute agree-
ments with persons who expect to reap a profit from their own services
or other active participation in a business venture. Such contracts are
clearly distinguished from instruments issued to persons who, for a con-
sideration paid, stipulate for a right to share in the profits or proceeds of
a business enterprise to be conducted by others ....
37 Cal. 2d at 768, 235 P.2d at 603.
73. Id.
74. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
75. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (1961).
76. Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App. 3d 224, 234, 84 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902 (1970).
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Limited Partnership Interests Under the Risk Capital Test
Combining those components which, by implication, are
central in the California cases, the risk capital test appears to
require (1) an investment in a common enterprise, (2) where
the investor furnishes the capital to be placed at risk, (3) with
or without an expectation of profit," (4) and takes a passive
role in the conduct of the enterprise. On these criteria, nearly
all limited partnership interests would be securities. Limited
partners invest all or part of the capital which is risked in the
common partnership enterprise, and as a general rule, they do
not participate actively in the partnership enterprise. However,
in situations where the limited partners perform some active
functions in the venture, the ambiguity of the investor passiv-
ity requirement may present a problem. Under the California
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a limited partner may not
take part in the "control" of the partnership enterprise without
losing his "limited" status and thus his immunity from per-
sonal liability."8 This prohibits managerial activity on the part
of the limited partners, but it does not bar all participation."
Whether the passivity requirement of the risk capital test
merely reflects the statutory ceiling on participation by a lim-
ited partner, or whether it imposes stricter limitations, is not
clear. Consequently, in a venture where the limited partners
take or can be expected to take an active but less than manage-
rial role, the risk capital test offers little guidance to promoters
who need to know whether the limited partnership interests
they expect to market are subject to California securities laws."0
77. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
78. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507(a) (West Supp. 1975) provides:
A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he
takes part in the control of the business.
79. See Plasteel Prod. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959); Grainger
v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act also provides that limited partners may not
contribute services. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15504 (West 1955). A Colorado Supreme Court
decision has held that "contribution" refers to contributions by limited partners at the
time of formation only. Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954). A federal
district court decision states that the limitation is not confined to contributions at the
formation of the partnership, but applies whenever the only contributions for which
profits are to be paid are services. Plasteel Prod. Corp. v. Eisenberg, 170 F. Supp. 100,
103 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959). Under either of
these definitions a "contribution" in the form of minor participation by the limited
partners, where it did not constitute their original or only contribution, would be
permitted.
80. An identical problem would arise under the mutual selection test if investor
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Mutual Selection v. Risk Capital
The risk capital test is now the generally accepted test for
defining "security" in California.' While it has been used to
categorize a wide variety of investment interests, it has never
been applied in a case involving limited partnership interests.
On the other hand, all three of the cases employing the mutual
selection test dealt with limited partnership interests," and
they have never been overruled or disapproved in the subse-
quent risk capital cases. From that standpoint it would appear
that a California court would apply the mutual selection test
when charged with determining whether or not a particular
limited partnership interest is a security. However, mutual
selection may no longer provide a useful or consistent standard
for characterizing limited partnership interests, especially in
light of the subsequent widespread use of the risk capital test.
Consequently, a question arises as to what test a California
court should apply to determine whether a limited partnership
interest is a security as defined in section 25019 of the Corpo-
rate Securities Law.
There are a number of reasons to doubt the continued
usefulness of the mutual selection test. First, the test is too
narrow: it ignores the whole range of limited partnerships
which are offered and sold to the public at large-and conse-
quently do not offer a right of mutual selection-by excluding
such organizations from the class of "bona fide" partnerships.
It is a strained interpretation to insist that an association
formed in compliance with the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act83 is not a "bona fide" partnership. A more logical interpre-
tation is that any limited partnership which conforms to the
provisions of the Act is a bona fide partnership, and that the
participatory interests in some of these partnerships may also
be securities under the Corporate Securities Law. In so far as
the mutual selection test serves only to identify and exclude
"true" limited partnerships, it is irrelevant. Both the large
public partnership and the small organization with controlled
passivity is one of the positive criteria of that test. Presumably, investor passivity
would be included whether the mutual selection test draws its positive criteria from
the California case law or from Dahlquist's four elements, which also include the
requirement that investors be passive. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
81. Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 390 (1974).
82. See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
83. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15502 (West Supp. 1975).
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membership may be securities and should be judged, for the
purpose of determining the status of their investment interests,
in accord with a more relevant set of criteria.
Another objection to the acceptance of the mutual selec-
tion test is that it would create a double set of standards for
defining "security" under the Corporate Securities Law. Since
all other types of interests apparently are to be subjected to the
risk capital test, maintaining the mutual selection test for part-
nership interests would require segregating them and judging
them according to different criteria.84 A dual standard would
not be objectionable if peculiarities of the limited partnership
as an investment vehicle made the risk capital test an inade-
quate standard, or even if the two tests achieved the same
result when applied in generally similar circumstances. How-
ever, neither of these conditions exists. The risk capital test
provides a uniform standard; while it is not entirely clear in all
its aspects, it is no less applicable to limited partnership inter-
ests than to any other type of investment interest. Moreover,
the risk capital and mutual selection tests may compel contra-
dictory conclusions on identical facts.85
Finally, use of the mutual selection test would create a
potential anomaly: disparate treatment of limited partnership
interests under the Real Estate Syndicate Act and the Corpo-
rate Securities Law. A limited partnership with fewer than 100
members formed for an investment in real estate is a security
under the Real- Estate -Syndicate Act 6 even where there has
been a mutual selection of partners. In contrast, a similar part-
nership formed for non-real estate investment and thus outside
the jurisdiction of the Real Estate Syndicate Act would not be
a security under the Corporate Securities Law if the mutual
selection test were applied: the existence of a right of delectus
personarum would make it a "bona fide" limited partnership
84. Although the mutual selection test, in origin and application, deals only with
partnership interests, there is no reason why it could not be applied in many of the
fact situations presented in the risk capital cases. See cases cited note 64 supra.
Possibly, the fact that it has not been used more extensively reflects on its usefulness
as a standard for determining the reach of the securities laws.
85. This would be so in the case of a small limited partnership where the mem-
bers had exercised a right to determine membership, provided the risk capital for the
enterprise, and took a passive role in its conduct. Under the mutual selection test, such
a partnership is a "bona fide" limited partnership and, therefore, not a security.
Conversely, under the risk capital test, such a partnership is a security because of risk
to the investors' capital and their passive position in the conduct of the enterprise.
86. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
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exempt from securities regulation. While the Department of
Real Estate and the Department of Corporations have different
jurisdictions, there is a certain degree of interaction, 7 and
agencies which regulate similar interests with similar objec-
tiyes should not arrive at contradictory definitions of such key
jurisdictional terms as "security."
In summary, the mutual selection test provides an inade-
quate standard for determining whether limited partnership
interests are securities under the Corporate Securities Law.
When Dahlquist proposed the test in 1945, large public part-
nerships were neither prevalent nor anticipated."8 Conse-
quently, the application of the mutual selection test to modern
limited partnership interests results in an artificial distinction
between "bona fide" limited partnerships and all others.
Neither the Uniform Limited Partnership Act nor the Corpo-
rate Securities Law makes such a distinction. More important,
the use of the mutual selection test would set up a separate
standard for defining "security" applicable only to limited
partnership interests. Where the predominant test is adequate
to accomplish the same purpose, a second and potentially in-
consistent test is undesirable. In addition, the use of the mu-
tual selection test could, in some circumstances, lead to contra-
dictory definitions of "security" under the Real Estate Syndi-
cate Act and the Corporate Securities Law, with no policy to
be served or benefit to be achieved by such variance.
As between the mutual selection and risk capital tests, the
latter is a preferable standard. Nevertheless, the ultimate fact
is that it is impossible to predict which test now represents the
judicial preference. Confronted with a limited partnership in-
terest, a California court could apply the mutual selection test
as settled law or opt for the risk capital test as representing the
87. In many cases the division of jurisdiction between the Department of
Corporations and the Department of Real Estate is highly technical. For example, a
limited partnership formed solely for an investment in real estate owned by 90 partners
would come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Real Estate. The same part-
nership with 110 partners would come under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corporations. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10251 (West Supp. 1975). In the case of limited
partnerships which own and operate agricultural land, jurisdiction between the two
departments depends upon whether the harvested products are processed or converted
into a different form. Cal. Dep't of Corp., Jurisdiction of Real Estate Syndicate Quali-
fication, Release No. 32-c, June 27, 1973.
88. In his article, Dahlquist states that limited partnerships "do not readily lend
themselves to bold and dishonest schemes whereby capital is raised to carry out a
venture by indiscriminate solicitation of the public at large." Dahlquist, supra note
19, at 363.
[Vol. 16
1976] LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
modern weight of authority. Possibly, a court would apply both
tests simultaneously: if there is mutual selection among part-
ners, the partnership interests would never be securities; but
where there is no mutual selection, risk capital criteria would
apply.
The end result is uncertainty. The syndicator of a limited
partnership cannot know which test will apply or precisely
what its elements are. Obviously, the safe procedure is to
assume that the interests to be offered are securities and sub-
ject to the securities laws. However, this does not resolve the
problem for the syndicator, the limited partners, or other par-
ties such as the Department of Corporations, in an action after
the fact where it must be determined whether or not the partic-
ular interest offered or sold was a "security."
THE FEDERAL DEFINITION
The Securities Act of 1933 applies to securities offered or
sold within the state9 and, unless it is exempted," requires
registration of any investment device that meets the Act's defi-
nition of "security," regardless of its status under state law.9
The definition of "security" in the 1933 Act" is substan-
tially identical to that contained in section 25019 of the Califor-
nia Corporate Securities Law, 3 and presents similar problems
of interpretation. The two statutes are also similar in purpose"
and general construction,95 but the federal courts have placed
more emphasis on identifying and defining the separate statu-
89. See note 9 supra.
90. The Act provides for a number of exemptions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-d (1970).
Partnerships offered and sold only within the state are exempted by the "intrastate"
offering exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970). The exemption, however, is only from the
registration requirements.
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-f (1970).
92. The Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as
any note, . . . evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, . . . investment contract, . . .
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security"
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
93. See note 31 supra.
94. Generally, the purpose of the federal Securities Act is to "protect the Ameri-
can public from speculative or fradulent schemes of promoters." SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
95. The Act is construed broadly, and form is disregarded for substance. Tcher-
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 337 (1967).
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tory categories. Of these, "investment contract" has received
a great deal of attention in the courts, and at least one federal
decision has found that limited partnership interests fall
within this category."
The Howey Test
The federal definition of "investment contract" has devel-
oped through a line of cases relying primarily on the U.S. Su-
preme Court decision, SEC v. WJ. Howey Co. 7 In Howey, the
Court held that an investment contract, for purposes of the
Securities Act, means "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the pro-
moter or a third party . . . ."I The investors in Howey had
purchased acreage units of citrus groves, the transactions in-
cluding agreements that the Howey Company would cultivate
and market the produce." The Court noted that all the ele-
ments of a profit-seeking venture were present.' 0 The investors
provided the capital and shared in the profits, while the pro-
moters managed the enterprise.'' Under the Court's definition,
the interests sold were "investment contracts" and therefore
securities within the meaning of the 1933 Act.102
The Howey definition of "investment contract" contained
four elements: (1) the investor invests money, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profit, (4) to be derived
solely from the efforts of others. This test has been employed
throughout the federal courts, but not without criticism.'" 3
The Profit Expectation Criterion
All limited partnerships meet the first two Howey criteria:
(1) the investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise. The
third requirement is an expectation of profit,0 4 but it is not
96. McGreghar Land Co. v. Megniar, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,273 (9th Cir.
1975).
97. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
98. Id. at 298-99.
99. Id. at 295-96.
100. Id. at 300.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 298.
103. See Coffey, supra note 68.
104. See text accompanying note 98 supra. Unlike a regular partnership, there
is no requirement in the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act that the partner-
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entirely clear what this test encompasses. It is apparently in-
tended to be an objective test focusing on the investor's expec-
tation of profits, occasioned by specific inducements or by the
nature of the enterprise.10 All limited partnerships contem-
plate profits,' 6 but investors seeking a tax shelter clearly are
looking initially-if not exclusively-for a loss.
In order to create a tax shelter, the partnership enterprise
must show some kind of loss, whether it be an actual loss, a
"paper loss," or a deductible depreciation of capital assets.'1
Typically, the losses are not sustained (or the promoters do not
intend them to be sustained) throughout the whole term of the
partnership, and in the end there may or may not be a net
profit based on the earnings of the enterprise. It is not clear
that a partnership designed to generate both an immediate loss
and an eventual profit would meet the profit-expectation test.
The requirement of profit expectation can be construed in three
ways: (1) that profit be the sole expectation of the investor; (2)
that it be the primary expectation; or (3) that it merely be
present. If profit must be the sole expectation of the investor,
most tax-shelter limited partnerships would escape classifica-
tion as securities, because they also contemplate the type of
losses which will produce a tax savings for the limited partners.
If profit must be the primary expectation of the investor, deter-
mination will require an elaborate case-by-case investigation
into the representations made to the investor and the expecta-
tions that might reasonably follow from them. On the other
hand, if profit expectation simply has to be present, virtually
all limited partnerships will meet the test.
ship be carried on for profit. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 15006 (West 1955) with id. §
15501 (West Supp. 1975).
105. In setting out the Howey test, the Court required that the person be "led to
expect profits." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (emphasis added).
This could mean that the investor is reasonably led to expect profits because of the
profit-seeking nature of the enterprise, or that he is led to expect profits because of
promises made by a promoter, or both. In either case, the test would be an objective
one.
106. Just from a practical economic standpoint, it is improbable that a syndica-
tor would form a partnership to carry on an enterprise if there were no profit to be
derived.
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code forbids deduction of losses on activities
not engaged in for profit. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 183. Consequently, a limited
partner would not be allowed a deduction if the limited partnership interest was
purchased for tax shelter purposes only.
107. See Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 2, at 58-59; Freshman & Frost, Tax
and Economic Analysis of Soft Dollar Syndications, 46 L.A. BAR BULL. 281 (1971).
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It is not merely the "expectation" concept that creates
difficulties, however; the problem is complicated by the ambi-
guity of the word "profit." If it merely means "benefit," then
from the standpoint of the limited partner, tax savings may be
considered part of his net profit. Even in cases where the
partnership enterprise shows a small net loss, the limited part-
ner, by adding in his tax savings, might show a net profit. The
question arises whether this would be a sufficient profit expec-
tation. May the expected profit appear only in the limited
partner's cumulative investment balance, or must there be an
expectation of profit from the business operations of the part-
nership itself?
The question is not academic. If "profits" equal "bene-
fits," every limited partnership carries with it the profit
expectation feature, regardless of what quantum of profit ex-
pectation is required. The investor who buys into an enterprise
only to reap the benefit of the start-up losses and accelerated
depreciation deductions, would nonetheless meet the strictest
profit-expectation requirement: his sole motive is to garner
enough losses to offset other income and produce a net "profit."
If "profit" refers to enterprise profit, however, there must be
an expectation that the enterprise will prosper, and the ques-
tion of the proper quantum of profit expectation remains rele-
vant: must it be "primary," or merely "present"?
The Efforts-of-Others Criterion
The fourth of the Howey criteria is the efforts-of-others
test. As a general rule, limited partnerships will meet this test,
since the limited partners, by the nature of their interest,
usually do not participate in the business enterprise. However,
there is no prohibition against minor, non-managerial partici-
pation on the part of the limited partners,' and thus it is
important whether the efforts test is construed strictly or liber-
ally.
Some earlier decisions applying the Howey test have inter-
preted the requirement that investors profit "solely from the
efforts of others" quite literally."9 Consequently, promoters
108. See notes 78-79 supra.
109. See, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.
1969); Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968);
Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964).
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were able to avoid the securities laws by requiring some minor
participation on the part of the investors. Recognizing this
problem, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,"" held that "solely" should be
read realistically rather than mechanically."' Where the
efforts of others are "undeniably significant ones""' 2 which af-
fect the management of the enterprise,"' participation by the
investor will not negate the finding of an "investment con-
tract," unless it has a substantial effect on the conduct of the
venture. This view has gained wide acceptance in recent fed-
eral decisions construing "investment contract,""' and it is
clearly the standard in the Ninth Circuit."5 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has never clarified its definition of "solely" and
has specifically declined to express its opinion of the Turner
interpretation of Howey.""1
The more liberal Turner interpretation clearly is to be pre-
ferred, for several reasons. A strict construction of the "efforts"
language is contrary to the thrust of the Court's opinion in
Howey, which stresses that the concept of a "security" embod-
ies a flexible rather than a static principle." 7 Also, an interpre-
tation that would prohibit any activity on the part of the inves-
tor, however minimal, represents a misreading of the Howey
test. In context, that test requires that profits be made solely
from the efforts of others."8 Profits are generated not by the
peripheral activities permissible for limited partners, but by
the "undeniably significant""" efforts of those who manage and
control the enterprise. Turner merely reiterates what is implicit
in Howey: the significant, profit-producing efforts must be
made solely by the managers and not by the investors. Non-
managerial participation by limited partners, consistent with
110. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
111. Id. at 482.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Koscott Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Central Chinchilla
Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d
Cir. 1973); Anspach v. Bestline Prod., Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But
cf. Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
115. See Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); Anspach v.
Bestline Prod., Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
116. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 2060 n.15
(1975).
117. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
118. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
119. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
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their role as defined by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,120
would not and should not prevent the classification of limited
partnership interests as securities. Finally, a narrow interpre-
tation of the "efforts" test would permit syndicators to circum-
vent the registration requirements of the federal securities law
by inserting a simple requirement of minor investor participa-
tion. In many cases such a requirement would have no practical
effect other than to evade the S.E.C. regulations. Certainly the
Howey Court did not intend the application of the securities
laws to be a matter of choice for the promoter.
Limited Partnership Interests Under the Howey Test
Like the risk capital test, the Howey test suffers from lack
of precision. As a rule, a limited partnership interest will meet
the first two criteria, and probably the fourth, since few limited
partnerships require or receive the active participation of
investors. Even where limited partners are active, they cannot,
by definition, assume managerial functions, and the applica-
tion of Turner in the Ninth Circuit would keep limited partner-
ship interests within the definition of "security." But the lack
of certainty as to the meaning of "profits" and the quantum of
profit expectation required impairs the usefulness of the test.
So long as this remains unsettled, it is impossible to precisely
state whether some limited partnership interests are "invest-
ment contracts" and must be registered in compliance with
federal securities law.
THE HAWAII DEFINITION
In an effort to develop a more certain and realistic ap-
proach to the definition of securities, the Hawaii Supreme
Court has formulated a new standard combining elements of
the Howey and risk capital tests. This test, as set out in State
v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,"' declares that an investment
contract is created whenever
(1)[a]n offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2)
a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is
induced by the offeror's promises or representations which
120. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (West Supp. 1975).
121. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
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give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable
benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will
accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to
exercise practical and actual control over the managerial
decisions of the enterprise."'
This test incorporates the desirable features of both the
federal and risk capital tests, and provides a predictable stan-
dard for gauging the status of limited partnership interests as
securities.
The general framework of the Hawaii court's test is derived
from Howey,'2 3 but the important element of risk is added. The
ambiguity inherent in Howey's profit expectation requirement
is resolved by requiring a "valuable benefit" rather than a
profit. A limited partner will always expect a benefit, which,
unlike "profit," clearly includes tax savings. Since benefit ordi-
narily will be the investor's only motive, whether that benefit
is from profits, tax savings or both, there is no need to speculate
about the required quantum of profit expectation. Finally, the
Hawaii test expressly accepts the liberal Turner construction
of the "efforts" requirement. Obviously, this approach also re-
solves one of the difficulties with the risk capital test, in that
it expressly sets out those criteria over and above the risk ele-
ment which are necessary for a finding that a particular inter-
est is a security.
It has been suggested that the Hawaii test is destined to
become the pre-eminent test for defining "investment
contract."'' 4 The similarities between the Hawaii and Califor-
nia definitions of "security"'' 5 suggest that the Hawaii test
could usefully be adopted by the California courts, either as the
sole test for the existence of a security, or at least as a practical
list of supplementary factors to be used in conjunction with the
risk capital determination. While these may be promising solu-
tions, they are not yet reality. Recent decisions in both Califor-
122. Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
123. The Hawaii Supreme Court acknowledged that its test was suggested by
Professor Coffey's article. 52 Hawaii at 642 n.5, 485 P.2d at 105 n.5. Professor Coffey,
in turn, asserted that his test is a refinement of the Howey criteria. Coffey, supra note
68, at 376.
124. Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as
Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV. 605 (1972).
125. Compare HAWAII REV. STAT. 485-1(12) (Supp. 1974) with CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 25019 (West Supp. 1975).
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nia and federal courts have taken note of Hawaii Market
Center, but none have adopted its test."'2
CONCLUSION
It has not been the purpose of this comment to assert that
the prevailing California and federal standards for defining
"security" are inherently bad standards. The problem in both
jurisdictions is that existing tests are unclear. Under the
Howey test the profit expectation criterion offers an uncertain
standard, especially in dealing with tax shelter limited partner-
ships where profit from the enterprise may not be the investor's
primary expectation. In California, the Real Estate Syndicate
Act provides a clear standard which specifically defines limited
partnership interests as securities. On the other hand, the ex-
istence of two unrelated and potentially conflicting tests for
defining "security" under the Corporate Securities Law is un-
desirable.
The acceptance of the test developed by the Hawaii Su-
preme Court would resolve the uncertainties that currently
plague both syndicators and courts charged with determining
whether limited partnership interests are securities under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the California Corporate Securities
Law. Adoption in the federal jurisdiction would merely add
risk-to-capital as a criterion and eliminate the ambiguities of
the efforts-of-others and profit-expectation tests. Acceptance
of the Hawaii test in California would clearly eliminate mutual
selection as a separate test, and clarify additional elements of
the present risk capital test.
While more precise tests are needed, a rigid standard is
neither desirable nor acceptable. The definition of "security"
must remain flexible as long as the marketplace invents new
investment vehicles. However, flexibility need not be synonon-
ous with uncertainty. While the securities laws should serve
primarily the purpose of protecting the public, they must also
provide a certain degree of predictability for those who must
operate within their ambit. It is submitted that the present
126. See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Nash &
Assoc., Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); A.B.A. Auto Leasing Corp. v. Adam
Ind., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 531 (D. Penn. 1975); Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of
Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974).
[Vol. 16
1976] LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 335
standards do not provide sufficient guidance in the case of
limited partnership interests.
Daniel B. Higgins

